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Does Asia have a distinct policy style? If so, what does it look like, and why does
it take the shape it does? This article argues that in the newly reinvigorated
emphasis of policy studies on policy instruments and their design lies the basis of
an analysis of a dominant policy style in the Asian region, with signiﬁcant implica-
tions for understanding the roles played by speciﬁc kinds of policy capacities. There
is a distinctly Asian policy style based on a speciﬁc pattern of policy capacities and
governance modes. In this style, a failure to garner initial policy legitimacy in the
articulation of instrument norms often results in later mismatches between instru-
ment objectives and speciﬁc mechanisms for their achievement. The formulation of
payments for ecosystem services policy is used to illustrate the capacities required
for policy designs and action to meet policy goals effectively.
Keywords: Asian policy style; policy instruments; governance modes; policy
capacity; payments for ecosystem services; environmental governance; Cambodia;
China, Indonesia; Nepal; the Philippines; Thailand; Vietnam
Introduction
Over the last few decades, policy dialogues around the world have remained abuzz
with topics of governance reform, with implications for how and what instruments of
governance are chosen to address complex policy problems. Key sectors such as envi-
ronmental policy have seen major shifts in governance styles, from the exclusive use of
command and control regulatory instruments, to policy situations that are more con-
ducive to market-based incentive-oriented mechanisms for controlling pollution (Jordan,
Wurzel & Zito, 2005; Wurzel, Zito & Jordan, 2013).
While the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a general trajectory from deregulation and
the use of more decentralised and market-oriented approaches to governance, the mid-
2000s saw a turnaround in this trend as the shortcomings of the undiscerning anything-
but-government movement became apparent. This, in turn, has led to yet another move-
ment away from the synthetic bifurcation between pure hierarchies and markets towards
more multi-layered forms of governance, combining elements of both and involving a
variety of policy actors.
The ebb and ﬂow of the two broad waves of governance reforms, and the lessons
learnt from their shortcomings, have given rise to several new alternate governance
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forms. They range from pure hierarchical and market modes to more hybrid styles of
metagovernance, each of which has its own particular requisites for success
(Meuleman, 2008, 2009; Howlett & Rayner, 2007; Tollefson, Zito & Gale, 2012;
Considine & Lewis, 1999; Peters, 1996; Howlett & Ramesh, 2015a, 2015b; Ramesh &
Fritzen, 2009).
These developments represent alterations to the predominant governance modes
found in different sectors and jurisdictions (Capano, Howlett & Ramesh, 2015). They
involve both fundamental relationships between governmental and non-governmental
actors and also distinct policy styles comprising preferences and patterns of policymak-
ing and policy instrument selection.
While adequate evidence exists in the case of OECD countries suggesting there has
been some convergence on a new market-oriented style and away from earlier legalist
and corporatist modes of governing (eg., Majone, 1994; Jordan, Wurzel & Zito, 2003;
Turner & Hulme, 1997; Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004; Scott, 2004), the situation in Asia
has been less clear, with the region being characterised by a great deal of governmental
diversity in institutional structures, practices and regimes. Nevertheless, some efforts
have been made to adapt the relevant concepts to the Asian context, especially in terms
of identifying key implementation structures and practices common to and across coun-
tries (Woo, 2015).
This article continues the discussion, highlighting the general nature of policy styles
and broaching the implications of any convergence towards a common Asian style. It
links penchants for particular instrument uses to speciﬁc capacity needs and identiﬁes
the critical capacity areas or needs of governments professing to follow this style
(Howlett & Ramesh, 2015b). Lessons are drawn concerning the likely success or failure
of many initiatives taken by Asian countries in recent years and in the future.
Policy styles in theory and practice
Contemporary policy studies recognise that public policies typically result from the
concerted efforts of multiple levels of government and other important policy actors to
achieve policy goals through the use of policy instruments. Policy design entails the
purposeful endeavour to articulate policy goals and link them with policy instruments
that are expected to accomplish these aims (Majone, 1994; May, 2005; Gilabert &
Lawford-Smith, 2012). It involves assessments of potential instrument use whose
impacts and feasibilities are reasonably well-understood (Lasswell, Lerner & Fisher,
1951; Parsons, 1995, 2001). Accordingly, policy design is understood as a particular
type of policy formulation involving the systematic analysis of the impacts of policy
instruments on policy targets, as well as the application of this knowledge to the cre-
ation and realisation of policies that are expected to attain desired policy outcomes
(Weaver, 2009, 2010; Bobrow & Dryzek, 1987; Bobrow, 2006; Montpetit, 2003).
Understandably, not all policy design processes can begin completely anew. Most
are limited by historical legacies and can become weighed down by various inconsis-
tencies and sunk costs linked to the existence of policy legacies or older generations of
policy elements. Although some policy instrument arrangements can be more successful
than others in creating a new, internally coherent combination, most designs are
focused more on reform rather than replacement of existing compositions (Howlett &
Rayner, 2007; Grabosky, 1994; Gunningham, Grabosky & Sinclair, 1998; del Rio,
2010).1
Asia Paciﬁc Journal of Public Administration 25
In comparative public policy, the concept of policy styles is used to describe and
explain the penchant for policymaking to occur in a similar way and with a similar
outcome due to the presence of historical legacies and institutional structures which
routinise decision-making (van Nispen & Ringeling, 1998; Richardson, Gustafsson &
Jordan, 1982). That is, “policymakers develop characteristic and durable methods of
dealing with public issues . . . [which] can be linked to policy outcomes and . . . sys-
tematically compared” using this concept (Freeman, 1985, p. 467).
Numerous case studies over the last three decades have highlighted the manner in
which actors in policy processes have tended to “take on, over a period of time, a dis-
tinctive style which affects . . . policy decisions, i.e. they develop tradition and history
which constrains and reﬁnes their actions and concerns” (Simmons, Davis, Chapman &
Sager, 1974, p.146). In response, the concept of a policy style is useful not only for
describing typical policy processes and deliberations, but also for capturing an impor-
tant aspect of policy dynamics involving the relatively enduring nature of these
arrangements. Thus, policy styles allude to institutional patterns of interaction between
policy actors which lead to the generation of distinct implementation logics (Howlett,
2000, 2004; Richardson, Gustafsson & Jordan, 1982; Gustaffson & Richardson, 1980;
Knill, 1999; Bekke & van der Meer, 2000).2
Policy styles have to do with the “observed preference of national governments for
certain types of instruments given the nature of state-society relations existing in each
nation” (Howlett, 1991, p. 16). A dialectic can be seen to exist, therefore, between pol-
icy formulators’ afﬁnity for choosing particular bundles of instruments and how these
choices are inﬂuenced by persisting policy styles (Howlett & Ramesh, 1993; Linder &
Peters, 1989).
In considering the analysis of policy instrument use in Asia, this is a useful
construct which can help overcome the considerable variation in regime type, history,
political structure, and cultural practices across the region. Although there has been
some dispute in the literature about the nature of these styles and their deﬁnition
(Freeman,1985; Richardson, Gustafsson & Jordan, 1982), many studies have suggested
that governments have tended to converge on a similar style, both cross-sectorally
(Freeman, 1985) and cross-nationally (Richardson, Gustafsson & Jordan, 1982; Kagan
1991, 2000; Kagan & Axelrad, 1997).
Is there a distinct Asian policy style?
A policy style can be thought of as existing as part of a larger policy regime or gover-
nance mode that emerges over time as policy succession takes place. National policy
systems can be seen as the offshoots of larger national governance and administrative
traditions or cultures (Dwivedi & Gow, 1999; Bevir & Rhodes, 2003), such as parlia-
mentary or republican forms of government, and federal or unitary states. These lead to
different concentrations of power in the central institutions of government, different
degrees of openness and access to information, and different reliance on certain govern-
ing instruments.3
Such a regime includes not only the manner in which policy deliberations take
place, but also the kinds of actors and ideas present.4 The regime or mode can be
thought of as integrating a common set of policy ideas (a policy paradigm), a long-last-
ing governance arrangement (or policy mix), a common or typical policy process (a
policy style), and a more or less ﬁxed set of policy actors (a policy subsystem or policy
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monopoly). Accordingly, it is a useful term for describing long-term patterns found in
both the substance and process of public policymaking.
The general idea is that policymaking tends to develop in such a way that the same
actors, institutions, instruments and governing ideas tend to dominate policymaking for
extended periods of time, infusing a policy sector with both a consistent content and a
set of typical policy processes or procedures. Although there are distinct sectoral policy
issues that are linked to common approaches taken towards speciﬁc kinds of problems
(Lowi, 1972; Salamon, 1981; Freeman, 1985; Burstein, 1991; Howlett, 2000), and
while Freeman (1985, p. 468) has observed that “each sector poses its own problems,
sets its own constraints, and generates its own brand of conﬂict”, many of these matters
are epiphenomenal or nested within larger national styles or arrangements. That is, in
each sector there are different conﬁgurations of societal actors, such as business, labour,
special interest groups, think tanks and university centers, with different analytical
capabilities and policy expertise, different degrees of independence with respect to
funding, and different relationships with state actors (Lindquist, 1992); but these all
operate within larger national boundaries.5
From this perspective, in looking for patterns of particular policy instrument use in
a region like Asia, it is important to determine ﬁrst if there is a common policy regime
and style throughout the region; and if so, what it is. Any such common governance
style would be a critical determinant of policy ﬁt and the prospects for success or fail-
ure of any policy design, including signiﬁcant change or reform. Thus, how can such a
style be identiﬁed?
Governing is what governments do: controlling the allocation of resources among
social actors; providing a set of rules and operating a set of institutions setting out
“who gets what, where, when and how” in society; while at the same time managing
the symbolic resources that are the basis of political legitimacy (Lasswell, 1958). In its
broadest sense, governance is a term used to describe that mode of coordination exer-
cised by state actors over social ones in their efforts to solve familiar problems of col-
lective action inherent in government and governing (Rhodes, 1997; de Bruijn & ten
Heuvelhof, 1995; Kooiman, 1993, 2000; Majone, 1997; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000).
That is, governance is about establishing, promoting and supporting a speciﬁc type of
relationship between governmental and non-governmental actors in the governing pro-
cess.
Policymaking and policy formulation, and hence policy instrument design and use,
are heavily inﬂuenced by the precepts of the governance and administrative model con-
stituting the operating environment of a policy style (Castles, 1990; Kagan, 1991;
Vogel, 1986; Eisner, 1993; Harris & Milkis, 1989). In modern Asian countries, as in
other societies, this means managing relationships with businesses and civil society
organisations which are also involved in the creation of public value and the delivery
of goods and services to citizens (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Although many permutations
are possible (Howlett & Rayner, 2007; Tollefson, Zito & Gale, 2012; Considine &
Lewis, 1999; Peters, 1996), ultimately there are four ideal types of governance relation-
ships: the legal-hierarchical and market pure types and the network and corporatist
hybrid types: see Table 1. Each of these ideal types corresponds to a particular policy
style, deﬁning the kinds of instruments commonly used to create and administer poli-
cies.
What is the situation in Asia with respect to these types? Some general patterns of
instrument choice in Asia have been discernible since the late 1990s as a number of
countries in Asia such as Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, China and the Philippines have
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adopted a decentralised approach to governance and have moved from a purely legalist
regime towards one more amenable to market-oriented policy solutions (eg., Bardhan,
2002; Adhikari, 2009; George, Pierret, Boonsaner, Christian & Planchon, 2009; Dam,
Catacutan & Hoang, 2014). Despite the range of experiences with devolved governance
of environmental resources in Asia, many programmes have emerged with a common
implementation logic surrounding the creation of policies that address environmental as
well as poverty alleviation goals through compensation mechanisms. The experience
with these programmes, similar to that with several others in the region in healthcare,
pensions and education policy realms, reﬂect a corporatist policy style in the Asian
context in which policy designs and instrument uses reﬂect overall governance orienta-
tions centred around the close and evolving ties between governments and the private
sector (Beeson, 2014; Haggard, 1998; Cheung, 2005; Mok, 2006; Jayasuriya, 2001;
Mok & Forrest, 2008).
Linking policy styles and policy success: the idea of critical policy capacities
While a discussion of broad policy styles has value, what are the implications for pol-
icy success and failure? It is pertinent to recognise the propensity for policy designs to
utilise policy instruments congruent with a particular governance mode, such as a cor-
poratist one in Asia. But simply selecting instruments and designs in this way does not
ensure policy success.
Recent work on policy capacity outlines the fundamental nature of the skills and
resources governments need to formulate and implement policy effectively (Howlett &
Ramesh, 2015a, 2015b; Wu, Ramesh, Howlett & Fritzen, 2010; Rotberg, 2014;
Bullock, Mountford & Stanley, 2001). The work highlights the inter-relationships
between governance modes and policy styles and the competences and capabilities of
governments in using the modes and styles.
The arrangements exist at three levels: individual, organisational and system (Wu,
Ramesh & Howlett, 2015). Individually, those working for policy need to possess tech-
nical expertise for substantive policy analysis and the communication of knowledge,
while necessary skills of those in management roles also include leadership and negoti-
ation expertise. Individual political acumen for understanding the interests of various
stakeholders and gauging political feasibility is also a fundamental capacity for success-
ful governance. At the organisational level, information mobilisation capacities to facili-
tate policy analysis, administrative resources for successful coordination between
policymaking agencies, and political support all contribute towards an overall policy
capacity. At the system level, institutions and opportunities for knowledge creation and
use need to exist alongside arrangements for accountability and securing political legiti-
macy. Altogether, nine forms of policy capacity can be distinguished at three function-
ing levels of a governance mode: see Table 2.
Table 1. Modes of governance by central mode of actor coordination and signiﬁcance of state
role.
Signiﬁcance of state role
Central mode of
actor coordination
Higher Lower
Hierarchical Legal governance Corporatist governance
Plurilateral Network governance Market governance
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With respect to assessing the likely capacity determinants of success or failure in
any policy style, including the Asian corporatist style, the central question is: what is
required for each of the ideal governance modes to operate effectively? In general, gov-
ernments would like to enjoy high levels of capability and competence in all aspects of
capacity in order to enjoy high capacity to perform their policy functions. Each of the
various types of policy capacity is fundamentally important for any system of gover-
nance to function well. Shortcomings in one or a few of the dimensions may be offset
by strengths along other dimensions, but no government can expect to be capable if
lagging along many dimensions (Tiernan & Wanna, 2006). At the extreme, for exam-
ple, governments may ﬁnd themselves overburdened with economic problems or social
demands so that hierarchical governance – comprising a policy framework whereby the
most important actors are government and the state implements policies by ordering
and sanctioning – may no longer prove to be an efﬁcient or effective form of
governance.
Some shortfalls in capacity are especially critical in speciﬁc modes of governance
and constitute their “Achilles heel” (Menahem & Stein, 2013). For example, in recent
years in many jurisdictions the default reform often adopted by governments seeking to
improve upon hierarchical governance has been to turn to a market or network mode
of governance (Weimer & Vining, 2011). However, in order to function effectively,
markets require stringent yet sensible regulations that are diligently implemented. These
are conditions that are difﬁcult to meet for many governments and in many sectors due
to a lack of sufﬁcient analytical, managerial, and/or political competences and capabili-
ties. Technical knowledge, for example, is thus a critical competence required for mar-
ket-based governance. Analytical skills at the level of individual analysts and policy
workers are key, and the policy analytical capacity of government needs to be espe-
Table 2. Policy capacities and levels.
Level
Capacity
Individual Organisational System
Analytical 1.Policy analytical
capacity: knowledge of
policy substance and
analytical techniques and
communication skills
2. Organisational
information capacity:
information and e-
services architecture;
budgeting and human
resource management
systems
3. Knowledge system
capacity: institutions and
opportunities for
knowledge generation,
mobilisation and use
Operational 4. Managerial expertise
capacity: leadership;
strategic management;
negotiation and cnﬂict
resolution
5. Administrative
resource capacity:
funding; stafﬁng; levels
of intra-agency and
inter-agency
coordination
6. Accountability and
responsibility system
capacity; rule of law;
transparent adjudicative
system
Political 7. Political acumen
capacity: understanding
of the needs and
positions of different
stakeholders; judgment
of political feasibility
8. Organisational
political resource
capacity: politicians’
support for the agency;
levels of inter-
organisational trust and
communication
9. Political economic
system capacity: public
legitimacy and trust;
adequate ﬁscal resources
Source: adapted from Howlett and Ramesh (2015a, 2015b).
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cially high to deal with complex quantitative economic and ﬁnancial issues involved in
regulating and steering the economy and preventing crises (Rayner, McNutt & Well-
stead, 2013).
Legal systems of governance similarly require a high level of managerial skills in
order to avoid diminishing returns with compliance or growing non-compliance with
government rules and regulations (May, 2005). System level capabilities are especially
crucial in this mode of governance because governments will ﬁnd it difﬁcult to com-
mand and control in the absence of the trust of the target population. Recruiting and
retaining honest and altruistic leaders, however, is often difﬁcult for the public sector
for a variety of reasons (British Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2001), while the cumbersome account-
ability mechanisms put in place in the public sector to prevent corruption and abuse of
powers also promote risk aversion (Hood, 2010). These problems need to be compre-
hended, with this element of policy capacity being enhanced through a greater account-
ability and responsibility system capacity (Aucoin, 1997).
While network governance may perform well when dealing with sensitive issues
such as parental supervision or elderly care (Pestoff, Brandsen & Verschuere, 2012), in
other instances civil society may not be well enough constructed, coordinated or
resourced to be able to create beneﬁcial network forms of governance (Tunzelmann,
2010). Networks, for example, can fail when governments encounter capability prob-
lems at the organisational level such as a lack of societal leadership, poor associational
structures, and weak state steering capacities which make adoption of network gover-
nance modes problematic. As Keast, Mandell and Brown (2006) have noted, networks
raise severe managerial challenges at the level of competences: “Networks often lack
the accountability mechanisms available to the state, they are difﬁcult to steer or con-
trol, they are difﬁcult to get agreements on outcomes and actions to be taken, and they
can be difﬁcult to understand and determine who is in charge”. A recurrent problem
faced by efforts to utilise network governance is that the routines, trust and reciprocity
which characterise successful network management (cf., Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012) take
a long time to emerge. Such relationships cannot simply be established by ﬁat as with
hierarchy, or emerge spontaneously in response to forces of demand and supply as with
markets. Networks are thus hard to establish where none exists already, and a very crit-
ical capacity issue for network governance is the managerial expertise capacity needed
to establish and maintain them.
Each of these gaps highlights the need for adequate capacity in critical areas for a
speciﬁc kind of governance system to achieve its potential. Speciﬁc governance modes
are prone to speciﬁc types of failure caused by speciﬁc capacity shortages in critical
areas required for that mode to function. For corporatist regimes, such as those com-
mon in Asia, effective administrative structures and processes and the level of coordi-
nation are vital. Inspired by conceptions of the chain of command in the military,
corporatist regimes or reform initiatives stress hierarchy, discipline, due process, and
clear lines of accountability. At the level of capabilities, corporatist modes of gover-
nance require a great deal of coherence and coordination to function effectively due to
horizontal divisions and numerous hierarchical layers found in their bureaucratic struc-
tures (Lehmbruch & Schmitter, 1982; Wilensky & Turner, 1987). Unlike markets where
prices perform some essential coordination functions, coherence and coordination must
be actively promoted in corporatist forms of governance and combined with political
skills in understanding large scale stakeholder needs and positions (Berger, 1981;
Lehmbruch & Schmitter, 1982). Hence, organisational political capacity is critical and a
sine qua non of successful performance for the corporatist mode of governance.
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An illustrative case: payments for ecosystem services policy in Asia
The relationships discussed above and the need for high levels of organisational politi-
cal capacity in corporatist regimes are illustrated by examples from payments for
ecosystem services (PES) policies in the region. According to the Millennium Ecosys-
tem Assessment (2005), ecosystem services are deﬁned as the aggregate beneﬁts people
derive from natural systems. Included under the broad classiﬁcation of ecosystem
services are provisioning services such as food, water and timber; regulating services
such as water quality, carbon sequestration and climate regulation; cultural services
such as recreation; and supporting services such as nutrient cycling and soil creation
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Engel, Pagiola & Wunder, 2008).
It is evident that, apart from the provisioning services that can be classiﬁed as market
products, most of the other beneﬁts obtained from ecosystem services occur as positive
externalities and are, therefore, under-provided by the economy alone, making the provi-
sion of these services a policy-oriented initiative. In addition, these services emerge out
of the preservation of natural capital which conﬂicts with most economic activities such
as intensive agriculture that leads to its extraction and depletion. Also, unclear property
rights linked with natural resources and a lack of ecosystem knowledge pose threats to
the provision of ecosystem services. This is a major issue in newly decentralised states
in Asia such as Indonesia where land tenure irregularities have led to several instances
of conﬂict (Engel, Pagiola & Wunder, 2008; Leimona, van Noordwijk, de Groot &
Leemans, 2015; Suyanto & Leimona, 2005).
Although a singular deﬁnition of PES does not yet exist in policy forums, the ser-
vices are generally understood to be “voluntary transactions, where a well-deﬁned envi-
ronmental service [or land use likely to secure that service] is being ‘bought’ by an
ecosystem service buyer from an ecosystem service provider if and only if the service
provider secures service provision [conditionality]” (Wunder, 2007, p. 48). Consistent
with this deﬁnition, PES systems follow a principle of conditional payments to address
and assign value to conserving natural resources that secure various ecosystem services
such as those that “forest owners generate for others with no direct rewards to them-
selves through the market” (de Janvry & Sadoulet, 2004, p. 2). By using compensation
to link the interests of landowners and external actors, the implementation of a PES
programme acknowledges the often difﬁcult trade-offs between the conservation and
transformation of ecosystems (Wunder, 2007).
While the very core of PES policies and programmes in Asia and elsewhere reﬂects
an evolving preference for private rather than state modes of environmental conserva-
tion, the assumption is that buyers and sellers of an environmental service can arrive at
mutually beneﬁcial agreements. The programmes have emerged as a mechanism to
secure environmental services by transforming positive externalities linked with envi-
ronmental conservation into ﬁnancial incentives for local providers. This has not been
possible without public sector support. Whether in terms of law enforcement, creating a
market infrastructure or formal recognition of resource ownership and extraction, the
regulating and coordinating role of public intervention has been critical to the success
of PES programmes and underlines the corporatist nature of these arrangements (Bayon
& Jenkins, 2010; Pirard, 2012; Yin, Liu, Yao & Zhao, 2013; McElwee, Nghiem, Le,
Vu & Tran, 2014; Pirard, de Buren & Lapeyre, 2014).
In the Asian context, the modern development of market-based PES programmes
ﬁnds itself very much embedded in a policy space deﬁned by the strong history of legal
instruments and hierarchical institutions of governance particularly when it concerns
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state-led environmental policy activities (Jayasuriya, 2001; Gillespie, 2014). Environ-
mental policy design in the region over the last few decades has reﬂected a range of
hybrid arrangements, with policies and programmes based on PES principles occurring
as a part of what environmental policy scholars refer to as “heterogenous systems of
environmental governance” (Quitzow, Holger & Jacob, 2013).
Despite the variety of environmental concerns and stakeholders involved in these
programmes in the region, the general common design components of PES policy in
Asia can be identiﬁed: see Table 3. Most of the broad PES principles, such as the
under-provision of ecosystem services by the economy and an assumption that a state-
supported, market-based instrument can address the shortcomings of centralised regula-
tion, are reﬂected in the high-level policy goals (cell 1, Table 3) that inform these pro-
grammes. In addition, the motivation for formulating PES policies in the Asian context
results from a general idea that by espousing compensation mechanisms for mainly
rural ecosystem service-supplying communities, PES programmes can address both
environmental conservation and poverty alleviation goals (Leimona, van Noordwijk, de
Groot & Leemans, 2015; Swallow, et. al., 2009).
At the broadest level of PES policy design, political capacities especially at the
organisational level can have several effects on how well government agents are able
to coordinate the interests of different stakeholders and facilitate the accurate mapping
of general policy aims to overarching implementation logics. According to the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2014), annual incomes from PES policies in the
Asian region constitute almost half of the global total. Despite a wide variety of
slightly different hybrid arrangements in Asian countries that strive to incorporate mar-
ket-based instruments in strong hierarchical realities, the capacity constraints related to
the design and effective execution of PES policies are very similar (Leimona, van
Noordwijk, de Groot & Leemans, 2015; Adhikari, 2009).
First, undermined political legitimacy at the initial stages of design can lead to
imbalances between the understood rights and roles of politicians, administrators and
programme subjects. For example, in China with state actors taking on the role of inter-
mediaries, along with buyers through state-owned companies as well as regulators at
the district levels, government actors ﬁnd themselves having to represent multiple inter-
ests (Scherr & Bennett, 2011; Bennett, 2008). While designing regular management
interventions may be necessary in order to ensure the sustainability of PES pro-
grammes, arbitrary intercessions can weaken the smooth operation of instruments. For
example, in conﬂict situations involving sub-governments, community level sellers and
private sector buyers in Indonesia, the central government has had to revoke ad hoc the
mediating rights of district governments, thus leading to obstructions in the functioning
of some PES programmes (Wunder, et.al., 2008). Similarly, as highlighted in their
review of the PES experience in China, Scherr and Bennett (2011, p. 14) comment that
“sufﬁcient regulatory oversight and legal frameworks are necessary to protect both
ecosystem service providers and buyers when developing contractual agreements . . .;
however, at the same time, exclusive government control of ecosystem services markets
risks crowding out potentially signiﬁcant sources of conservation ﬁnance”.
Second, an incomplete understanding of the needs and priorities of various
stakeholders may limit the effective functioning of both political actors and administra-
tors, while limiting stakeholder participation. As has been evinced in some PES pro-
grammes in the Philippines and Indonesia, the emphasis on monetisation of services
can create mismatches in situations where ﬁnancial gains are not the main reason for
communities to join, with the communities instead being socially motivated to
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participate (Lapeyre, Pirard & Leimona, 2015; Leimona, van Noordwijk, de Groot &
Leemans, 2015; van Noordwijk, et. al., 2012). A similar mismatch between broad PES
policy principles and implementation logics can be caused in situations where the poli-
cies are used to meet other strategic political ends, furthering existing government regu-
lations (Peluso & Lund, 2011). An example of this is indicated in the analysis of
Vietnam’s PES policies which, while engaging co-ﬁnancing from private and interna-
tional organisations, do not result in a creation of market institutions, but rather “in
additional ﬁnancial resources to implement the government’s own policies in forest pro-
tection” (Suhardiman, Wichelns, Lestrelin & Hoanh, 2013, p. 96).
Third, a lack of political capacities to judge the feasibilities of PES policies at the
local level can result in miscalculations without a solid understanding of stakeholder
opportunity costs. PES programmes in Nepal, the Philippines and Indonesia have
shown that the strict conditionality principle is less ideal than a compensation or
co-investment principle that creates more equal sharing of risks. This is especially so in
the event of environmental disasters that can undo the work done by stewards to secure
the supply of the environmental services being considered and, thereby, jeopardise the
transfer of conditional payments (Leimona, van Noordwijk, de Groot & Leemans,
2015).
Concluding comments
All governments are concerned with policy success and failure. One source of failure
stems from the mismatches between policy design elements which can occur when par-
ticular designs of policy instruments and the governance mode or policy style these
instruments are to function within do not ﬁt well with each other. These mismatches
often result when critical governance capacities are deﬁcient, leading to the compro-
mised success of the entire instrument design process that follows.
In the Asian case, many sectoral policy regimes manifest aspects of an overall gov-
ernance mode based on corporatist arrangements, which results in many policy designs
and instrument uses being heavily inﬂuenced by the mode of governance and thus
reﬂecting a policy style congruent with it. This ﬁnding allows the speciﬁcation of some
conditions or pre-conditions for effective policy design in countries and sectors featur-
ing this arrangement. A common cluster of administrative challenges has been encoun-
tered, especially in the arena of environmental governance. Mainly, the gap between
the design and effective implementation of decentralised policies for environmental
management concerns “the division of labour and beneﬁts between levels of govern-
ment; the willingness of higher levels to grant authority to lower levels in practice; the
complexity of [forest-related] requirements that communities are unable to fulﬁl; and
the lack of institutional capacity and ﬁnancial resources at the local level to carry out
the devolved responsibilities” (Colfer, Dahal & Moeliono, 2012, p.1). An underlying
lack of trust between the various levels of administration, different stakeholders, and
the policy targets at the community level has been identiﬁed through experience in Asia
as being a major hurdle in the way of the success of many policy schemes (Capistrano,
2012). This highlights the need for high levels of a particular policy capacity, in this
case organisational political capacity, linked to the requisites of the particular policy
style.
These matters are well illustrated by the case of ecosystem services policies in Asia.
As To, Dressler, Mahanty, Pham & Zingerli (2012, p. 237) appreciate, although at ﬁrst
glance such schemes may appear to be market-based, since “PES schemes create a
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market for ecosystem services, such markets must be understood not simply as bold
economic exchanges between ‘rational actors’, but rather as exchanges embedded in
particular socio-political and historical contexts to support the sustainable use of forest
resources and local livelihoods”. PES policy development in Asia thus represents a sit-
uation where political capacities, especially at the organisational level, may be enough
to determine the strength of the overall governance capacity situation.
As the PES experience demonstrates, and consistent with current theory develop-
ment on governance capacity (Howlett & Ramesh, 2015a, 2015b), organisational politi-
cal capacity concerns become critical for hybrid governance types such as those
prevalent in environmental governance in Asia. Studies in countries such as Vietnam,
Cambodia and the Philippines all allude to the important role of political legitimacy for
PES programmes, as offered through secure land tenure regimes, legal support, and
government issued ﬁnancial regulations. These are all essential for constructing a clear
framework for PES implementation and evaluation (McElwee, Nghiem, Le, Vu & Tran,
2014; Suhardiman, Wichelns, Lestrelin & Hoanh, 2013).
Disclosure statement
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Notes
1. A key notion in this regard is that of “layering” (van der Heijden, 2011) or the changes made
over time only to some components of an existing policy arrangement through institutional
patterns that emerge over long periods of time
2. The work on policy styles has resulted in a number of categorisations for analytically distin-
guishing between national policy patterns such as those favouring implementation that is
deﬁned by either enforcement or consultation, or based on whether policy change factors that
are either radical or non-radical (Richardson, Gustafsson & Jordan, 1982; Gustafsson &
Richardson, 1980; Freeman, 1985). This work has brought to light the numerous hurdles in
the way of employing this lens for comparative work, as policy styles can vary within
nations by problem areas and even by policy making stages (Freeman, 1985).
3. Civil service organisations have rules and structures affecting policy and administrative beha-
viour such as the constitutional order establishing and empowering administrators, as well as
affecting patterns and methods of recruiting civil servants and how they interact with each
other and the public (Bekke, Perry & Toonen, 1993). A parallel argument can be found in
the ﬁeld of regulation. Knill (1999) states that regulatory styles are deﬁned by “the mode of
state intervention” (hierarchical versus self-regulation, as well as uniform and detailed
requirements versus open regulation allowing for administrative ﬂexibility and discretion)
and the mode of “administrative interest intermediation” (formal versus informal, legalistic
versus pragmatic, and open versus closed relationships). van Waarden (1995) argues that
“National regulatory styles are formally rooted in nationally speciﬁc legal, political and
administrative institutions and cultures. This foundation in a variety of state institutions
should make regulatory styles resistant to change, and hence from this perspective one would
expect differences in regulatory styles to persist, possibly even under the impact of economic
and political internationalisation”.
4. In work on social policy, for example, Esping-Andersen found “speciﬁc institutional arrange-
ments adopted by societies in the pursuit of work and welfare. A given organisation of
state–economy relations is associated with a particular social policy logic” (Rein, Esping-
Andersen & Rainwater, 1987). Similarly, in work on US policymaking, Harris and Milkis
(1989, p. 25) found regimes developed as a “constellation” of ideas justifying governmental
activity, institutions that structure policymaking, and a set of policies. Eisner (1993, p. xv)
deﬁnes a regime as a “historically speciﬁc conﬁguration of policies and institutions which
establishes certain broad goals that transcend the problems” speciﬁc to particular sectors.
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5. Similarly, Allison (1971) and Smith, Marsh and Richards (1993) have argued that the
“central state is not a uniﬁed actor but a range of institutions and actors with disparate inter-
ests and varying resources” and, therefore, there may not only be different degrees of coher-
ence within the state, but also different cultures of decision-making and inclusion of outside
actors with respect to policy development (collaboration, unilateral, reactive) in different sec-
tors. There are agency-level organisational factors that affect policymaking, with policy being
shaped by the nature and priorities of departments and agencies (Wilson, 1989; Richardson,
Jordan & Kimber, 1978; Jordan, Wurzel & Zito, 2003) which have distinct organisational
mandates, histories, cultures and programme delivery and front-line challenges (Lipsky,
1980; Hawkins & Thomas, 1989).
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